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The direction of Nigeria/South Africa relations can be better understood 
in terms of an evolved but nuanced struggle for preponderant influence 
on the continent by these two major pivots of the emerged post-Cold 
War constellation of forces in Africa. 
By Ademola Araoye
NIGERIa/SOUTH aFRICa











9V o l u m e  6 9  /  2 0 1 6
aFRICa
It is affirmed that the normative groundings of the foreign and security policies of post-Apartheid 
South Africa and the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria are respectively ahistorical 
and therefore problematic. In the 
grand sweep of human affairs, in 
particular in relation to the fate of 
black humanity, a critical legitimate 
raison d’être of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and post-Apartheid Republic of 
South Africa is their shared destiny as 
the only credible nucleus of a vanguard 
of an African force or a continental 
alliance for the holistic emancipation 
of black humanity. Between the 
two they possess roughly 21 per 
cent of the continent’s population, 
the basic minimum demographic 
threshold, common sentiments 
around the peculiar historicity of their 
shared humanity, depth of political 
consciousness and the two biggest 
economies of the continent. They 
also have the technological and crude 
power requisites of a credible African 
force necessary for the consolidation 
of the disparate assets of the 
continent, for meaningful change of 
the circumstances of Africa and black 
humanity. 
Relations between South Africa 
and Nigeria betray an unfortunate 
lack of appreciation of the imperatives 
of their historic obligations to 
Africa. The ahistoric character and 
associated deficit in the normative 
foundations of South Africa/Nigeria 
relations flows from their acceptance 
of the impositions of conventional 
norms and protocols of inter-state 
engagement and inherited status quo, 
including procedures deriving from 
the dominant paradigms, ideational 
foundations and protocols as well as 
the procedures of inter-state relations. 
These conventional operative protocols 
merely ensure the perpetuation of the 
status of the factionalised continent as 
consolidated appropriated spaces of 
hegemonic forces. 
The legitimate gauge for evaluating 
relations between South Africa and 
Nigeria must transcend conventional 
prisms for the analysis of foreign and 
security policy. It cannot be based 
on the assessment of their pursuits 
of petty, mundane and ephemeral 
objectives, including even the search 
for transient economic pre-eminence. 
To pass this compelling normative 
muster, the two leading sub-nations of 
the African continent necessarily need 
to defect from their implied current 
almost unquestioning acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the prevailing 
African order.  South Africa and 
Nigeria must transform their politics 
of conservative status quo forces to 
become revisionist actors determined 
to wreck the African regional order as 
presently constituted.
Independence deepened Africa’s 
woes. The 1963 reactionary rejection 
of a visionary initiative to repudiate 
a balkanised Africa instituted by 
European powers at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884 has proven to 
be a tragic antecedence of the curse 
of the African state system. The 
infamous compromise leading to the 
establishment of a loose organisation 
in the Organisation of African Unity 
consolidated the designs of imperial 
powers to ring fence a divided Africa in 
the service of their respective imperial 
interests. The decision has since 
haunted Africa. 
The Casablanca bloc, led by Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana, advanced the 
cause of a federation of all African 
countries. Other members of the bloc 
included Algeria, Guinea, Morocco, 
Egypt, Mali and Libya. Founded in 
1961, its members were described 
as "progressive states". The Monrovia 
bloc, led by the likes of Leopold 
Sedar Senghor of Senegal, felt that 
unity should be achieved gradually 
through economic cooperation. 
These men did not, at the instigation 
of their controllers in France and the 
United States, support the notion of an 
African federation. Other conservative 
states unenthusiastic about an African 
federation in 1963 were Nigeria, 
Liberia, and Ethiopia. The conservative 
bloc included most of the former French 
colonies. Since then Africa’s geo-
political structure has not significantly 
been altered neither in response to the 
evolution of the global states-system 
nor in reaction to the glaring fact of the 
inadequacy of current configuration to 
advance Africa’s interests, especially 
honing it institutionally to enhance its 
own penetration and value extraction 
capacity. The African deleterious 
mindset is as firmly entrenched in 2016 
as in 1963.
As a result, the current configuration 
of the Africa geo-political space housing 
a myriad of 56 ostensible sovereign 
states, quasi states and absolutely 
sheer nonentities has remained 
an immovable impediment to any 
meaningful projections of Africa’s 
interests.  The reality is daunting. Only 
five African states, namely Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, Democratic Republic 
of Congo and South Africa each house 
more than 5% of Africa’s population. 
The projected population of these 
states as at July, 2015 ranged from 
Nigeria’s 184,264,000, representing 
16% of Africa’s population to South 
Africa’s 55 million people at 4.77% of 
the continent’s people. 43 per cent of 
Africa’s population is concentrated in 
these five states. Twenty-six African 
states or 38 per cent have a population 
of less than 5 million. 26 per cent of 
African states have a population of 
less than 2 million. 30 or 54% of states 
and political entities in Africa hold 
just about or less than 1 per cent of 
the population of the continent. Nine 
states representing 16 per cent of states 
in Africa have a population of less 
than a million. On the average, when 
the five major most populous states 
are put aside, the average population 
of the African state is just about 12 
million. By today’s standards and given 
the historical context of Africa in the 
scheme of global affairs, about 40% 
of African states are highly unable to 
extract some value in their own local 
environments and hopelessly out of 
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reckoning in the global competition for 
extractive value. 
The African strategic landscape and 
the overall context of South Africa 
Nigeria relations have been shaped 
by historical and contemporary forces 
and interests beyond the individual 
capacity of the two states to contain or 
neutralise. Together, however, South 
Africa and Nigeria provide a potential 
formidable nucleus of a revisionist 
alliance and force to reshape the 
configuration of power and restructure 
this deleterious strategic landscape of 
the continent. 
Africa’s systemic regimes or the 
continental order are determined by 
strong extra-African forces operating 
from the global system. These forces 
possess the capacity to impose their 
will or influence the direction of new 
regimes in the international system. 
Their capacities for power imply 
significant leverage and influence to 
perpetuate the existing order and 
maintain the status quo, if necessary, 
by all and any means. 
In the least, the historic obligation 
for South African and Nigerian policy is 
to impose and assure the emancipatory 
centrality of Africa in African affairs. 
This has proven elusive also because 
of divergent internal conjunctions 
expressed in sharp contrasts in the 
domestic political and economic 
environments that have impacted their 
foreign policy decisions and outcomes 
respectively. 
Despite mutually strenuous 
convictions of the immense value of 
attaining harmonised and integrated 
operative understandings with each 
other, the pre-eminent salience of 
the formal policy of Afrocentricity and 
associated geo-regionally delineated 
concentricity that had guided a 
confident post-civil war Nigeria’s 
foreign policy in the golden era of the 
1970s effectively fizzled out with the 
end of the Cold War. 
Some have codified that there 
has been a significant decline in the 
quality and efficacy of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy ever since the precipitous 
and continuing spiraling of the 
country’s economic crisis. Some of the 
challenges identified in this connection 
include the unhealthy politicisation of 
the Foreign Service, demoralisation 
of the professional diplomatic cadres 
and poor funding of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry. Questions have also 
been raised about the capacity and 
competence of more recent Foreign 
Ministers.1 To this may be added 
the questionable quality of expertise 
immediately available to the President, 
since advisory roles on arcane and 
technical subjects are often doled out 
as political patronage to undeserving 
political apparatchiks. The intellectual 
capital and ideo-philosophical 
appreciations brought to office are 
very low and often completely non-
existent. These all have diminished 
the analytical, ideational or conceptual 
underpinnings of Nigerian foreign and 
security policy. 
In its place and in response to and 
addressing pressing domestic agendas, 
have arisen such non-concepts as 
Economic diplomacy, Democracy 
police, Citizen centered diplomacy 
and a host of very limiting, limited and 
disaggregated thematic ballyhoos bereft 
of any sterling import for what before 
now had been Nigeria’s dynamic, 
proactive and robust Afrocentric policy. 
Incidentally, the former golden ages 
were driven by renowned intellectuals 
who served as Ministers of Foreign 
affairs. Contemporary policy setbacks 
reflect a weakened salience of critical 
and coherent interrogations of the 
conceptual pivots of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. They illustrate a dearth or, 
worse still, a creeping repudiation of 
the dominant interpretive determinants 
of the historicity of black humanity 
and its ancestral location in Africa, the 
abandonment of authenticated historic 
impulses in favor of the ascendance 
of pragmatic political immediacy over 
long validated crucial integrationist 
impulses of Nigeria’s policy. Not even 
the controversial establishment of a 
bureaucratic contraption with the 
mandate for integration in Africa gave 
any impetus to continental affairs. 
The creation of the ministry merely 
reflected the diminution of the leverage 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
federal institutional hierarchy. 
Finally, one of the most devastating 
internal challenges Nigeria has 
faced since the civil war has been 
the emergence of Boko Haram, for 
which it was unprepared. The political 
management of the Boko Haram 
insurgency and the initial military 
engagements, especially under the 
Goodluck Jonathan administration, 
against the insurgency revealed an 
internal rot of unfathomable depth 
forcing the country to adopt an 
uncoordinated pragmatic policy of 
whatever worked. In this confused 
state the national civilian policy makers 
and the military hierarchy colluded 
to milk the national trauma to enrich 
themselves. Investigations conducted 
by the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) reveal that U$15 
billion (15 billion United States dollars) 
earmarked to buy arms to prosecute 
the war were diverted by high ranking 
political and military personalities 
charged with prosecuting the war.2   
These developments have coincided 
with internal political realignments with 
debilitating implications in and for the 
country. Finally, the era beginning from 
the Abacha maximum dictatorship up to 
the Jonathan Goodluck administration 
and including the Olusegun Obasanjo 
rule discounted the legacy of Nigeria’s 
dynamic and progressive engagements 
and its leadership of the last generation. 
As a fallout of its virtual pariah status 
occasioned by the nullification of the 
MKO Abiola mandate by the General 
Ibrahim Babaginda military presidency 
through the Sani Abacha maximum 
domination of its political space, 
analysts note that successive Nigerian 
rulers since the 1999 political transition 
have seemingly coveted the legitimacy 
which warmer relations with western 
powers conferred on their political 
agenda within the contested domestic 
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arena. Pleasing the West became the 
perceived gauge of internal political 
legitimacy of Nigeria leaders. 
In the Obasanjo administration 
foreign policy was a valuable tool to 
advance the egoistical ambitions of 
the President. As with his domestic 
engagements, where political 
action at all levels by the federal 
government was consistent with this 
personal thrust, Obasanjo largely 
conveniently associated with the 
Thabo Mbeki renaissance project, 
as they made concerted efforts to 
initiate African continental diplomacy 
through the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Union. The South Africa-
Nigeria Bi-national Commission was 
established3. But this was a calculated 
instrumental association. 
Cote d’Ivoire was a revealing 
seminal crisis for Africa – in particular 
for Nigeria/ South Africa relations. In 
Abidjan, Olusegun Obasanjo defected 
from the progressive Afrocentric orbit 
and phenomenally failed on the single 
most important policy challenge 
Nigeria has been confronted with in its 
entire half century life as a state. 
Yet, from all angles: political, 
economic, socio-cultural and the 
very lessons of the travails of Nigeria, 
backing the Africanist Laurent Gbagbo 
against a clear proxy of France 
represented in Alhasane Ouattara was 
such a natural and compelling strategic 
choice. And there was broad consensus 
among Nigeria’s former progressive 
allies on this.  Obasanjo’s major policy 
stance in Cote d’Ivoire was dictated 
by his calculus that his support for the 
western backed Ouattara – a French 
stooge – would elicit a silent nod from 
Paris for his unconstitutional third term 
elongation project. 
The same pattern was repeated 
in breaking his solemn promise on 
behalf of Nigeria to deploy Nigeria’s 
clout to protect Charles Taylor (an 
acknowledged renegade) by handing 
him over to the ICC. That act of betrayal 
has undermined Nigeria’s future 
capacity to provide credible assurances 
that may be required in future delicate 
negotiations. The release of Taylor 
had been made a pre-condition for 
Obasanjo to be received by President 
George Bush where he had gone to 
court sympathy for his unconstitutional 
term elongation. Expecting greater 
rewards for his ambitions, Obasanjo 
led the stooges of France against 
Laurent Gbagbo, throwing Gbagbo 
and the South Africa led group of 
progressive African states under the 
rolling wheels of neo-imperialism in 
Africa.  Obasanjo and his clone in the 
Jonathan Goodluck administration 
undermined the progressive Thabo 
Mbeki vision of South Africa’s Africanist 
initiative. Out of office, he has retained 
an anachronistic presence in African 
affairs. 
This had repercussions for South 
African relations with Nigeria and, 
also, South Africa’s putative global 
realist inclinations. The South African 
administration under President Jacob 
Zuma, in a reflection of the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma context of its 
relations with Nigeria, was forced to 
return to the Elysee to control damage 
done due to the unreserved pursuit 
of a legitimate Africanist posture in 
the Ivorian conflict. In its over six 
year tenure, the Goodluck Jonathan 
administration barely made a whimper 
in policy, other than managing the 
dominant pursuit of ephemeral and 
petty dimensions of Nigeria/ South 
Africa relations. 
There are hopes that the change 
mantra of the Muhammadu Buhari 
administration will impact foreign and 
security policy. The big question in 
this regard is whether the anticipated 
change will have enough depth and 
steam to interrogate the dubious 
foundations of traditional inter-African 
diplomatic relations, especially in the 
reconstruction and forging of a new 
culture of emancipatory redirection of 
relations with South Africa.  President 
Zuma’s visit to Abuja in March 
2016, instigated by another serious 
economic altercation founded on the 
pursuit of ephemerals, produced an 
unanticipated spark for the progressive 
realignment of Nigeria/ South African 
relations.     
The end of apartheid raised hopes 
that post-Apartheid South Africa, 
under the leadership of the African 
National Congress, would inject a new 
dynamism and, with the entrenched 
military dictatorship and derogation 
of Nigeria’s perceived leadership 
credentials in the mid-1990s, provide 
leadership for progressive forces in 
the post-Cold war era in black Africa. 
It was felt that South Africa could not 
escape this African destiny. Unlike 
Nigeria which was plagued by chronic 
instability and security challenges, 
South Africa’s relative stability since 
its internal settlement enabled it to 
garner sufficient political capital to 
project itself as the leading power on 
the continent. And indeed, there was 
a leadership void in the constituency of 
progressive Africa. 
In that situation, the post-Apartheid 
South Africa’s Nelson Mandela/Thabo 
Mbeki’s ascendant African renaissance 
conceptual framework in the 2000s 
provided a promising template for an 
integrated and transformative Africanist 
era both for South Africa and the 
progressive forces on the continent 
as a whole. In fact, the renaissance 
acquired the stature of a de facto 
continental strategic framework 
to underpin an Afrocentric vision, 
consistent with the original core tenets 
of Pan-Africanism, which predated the 
accursed independence of Africa and 
post-liberation Southern Africa.  
Yet, in actuality, given the tectonic 
shifts and implications of the end of 
the Cold War and the post-settlement 
South Africa for the strategic lay of the 
continent, the immediacy attached to 
the emancipatory centrality of Africa 
in African affairs by the 1970s and 
early 1980s in Nigeria’s foreign policy 
paradoxically seemed to have been 
blunted with the formal defeat of 
Apartheid in 1994. At the same time, 
the policies of a euphoric, searching 
South Africa saw  
its role as trying to 
shape a new world 
order by being the 
foremost articulator 
of the interests of 
the third world and, 
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and cautious post-Apartheid South 
Africa and Nigerian foreign policies 
were respectively underpinned by 
perceived, even if misconceived, 
nuanced notions of national interests. 
Under the evolved circumstances, 
it was inevitable for the vision of the 
Pan-African pivotal credo of common 
destiny to be devalued, especially 
in the face of the incongruences 
of the historical conjunctures that 
characterised the beginnings of formal 
bilateral relationships between the two 
countries in the post-settlement era. 
It was ominous for the project of 
the holistic emancipation of Africa that 
South Africa emerged from Apartheid 
when Nigeria’s influence was waning 
under a dictatorship. Dealing with 
Sani Abacha’s Nigeria posed one 
of the earliest dilemmas for South 
Africa’s diplomacy in Africa. Was 
the Mandela administration going to 
toe the controversial line of solidarity 
with delegitimised self-serving African 
leaders, many of them only a shade 
different from Abacha, by opposing 
international criticism and sanctions 
againstatrocious leadership on the 
continent? Or was South Africa going to 
be directed by constructivist universal 
principles that entailed breaking ranks 
with conservative Africa?
South Africa’s balance in quiet 
diplomacy to stave off sanctions and 
prove Africa could resolve its own 
problems was betrayed by the Abacha 
regime. This led to popular perceptions 
that Pretoria had fallen short in 
managing the Abacha debacle in 
Nigeria. That was notwithstanding the 
dramatic turnaround of the Mandela 
government supporting sanctions 
against the Abacha dictatorship in 
reaction to the hanging of Ken Saro 
Wiwa and the Ogoni nine. Ironically, 
some analysts trace the underlying 
causes of perceived dysfunction of 
Abuja/ Pretoria relations to Pretoria’s 
desperate quest to gain acceptance 
in Africa after decades of apartheid 
isolation and destabilisation, in its 
pursuit of a policy of appeasement 
towards Abuja. 
It may be highlighted that the 
perceived outcomes on the Abacha 
challenge, and later profound 
divergence on the management of 
the Ivorian crisis, had more than 
just fleeting implications for South 
Africa/ Nigeria relations. President 
Thabo Mbeki, who was key to the 
consultations with Abacha’s Abuja, 
affirms that General Sani Abacha’s 
betrayal of a solemn undertaking he 
had with President Nelson Mandela 
of South Africa is responsible for the 
drift in the bilateral relations between 
Nigeria and South Africa.5 In the 
context of this evolved dilemma, the 
two leading African nations acting 
completely rationally – on the basis 
of their assumed realist inclinations 
– could not cooperate, or at least 
mutually engage at an elevated optimal 
strategic level, even if it appeared that 
it was in their best interests to do so. 
Again, in the parlance of games 
theory, this would be the equivalent of 
a lose-lose outcome with sub-optimal 
payoffs for both sides in mutual 
defection. Games theory is the study 
of models of conflict and cooperation 
between intelligent rational decision-
makers. South Africa / Nigeria relations 
can classically also be analysed from 
the conceptual prism of resolving a 
security dilemma or in the frame of 
a prisoner’s dilemma. The security 
dilemma refers to a situation in which 
actions by a state intended to heighten 
its security, such as increasing its 
military strength or making alliances, 
can lead other states to respond with 
similar measures, producing increased 
tensions that create conflict, even 
when no side really desires it.6
However in Abuja, the protocols 
and hierarchy of early engagements 
in sub-Sahara Africa of the immediate 
post-liberated South Africa was 
registered, in the context of Abuja’s 
own understanding of Nigeria’s vast 
comprehensive investments in the 
liberation struggle in Southern Africa, 
with some misgivings. These rocky 
beginnings seem to have coloured 
relations between the two countries. 
The immediate circumstance of 
Nigeria under a brutal dictatorship 
was a difficult context for the earliest 
interaction between the two countries. 
It is postulated that this is partly 
responsible for the devaluation of 
the authentic validating principles of 
Afrocentricity as the foundations of 
Africa policy of both countries. 
Paradoxically, the pursuit of 
ephemerals has been against the 
backdrop of institutional rhetoric of 
the determined search for a renaissant 
African future. Explicating the planks of 
the African renaissance and employing 
its tenets as a paradigm for evaluating 
South Africa’s African policy under 
Nelson Mandela, particularly under 
Thabo Mbeki and less so with the 
Jacob Zuma administrations, altogether 
spanning just over two decades, it 
emerges that South Africa’s post-
apartheid policy is driven by two major 
imperatives. 
The first is the conservative and 
institutional, which has been slow to 
accept as legitimate the pre-eminence 
of thoughts around the reversal of 
black humanity’s unworthy location 
in human affairs as the decisive 
foundation for policy. The imposition 
of considerations around evolved 
continental conjunctures vis a vis the 
global system as it affects black Africa 
at the end of the millennium could not, 
in this conservative mould of thinking, 
constitute valid underpinnings of policy 
of a rainbow nation in its engagement 
with Africa and the external world. South 
Africa is in a conceptually distinct space 
from Africa in this lingering thinking. 
This institutional element defines South 
Africa’s national interests narrowly. It is 
concerned with South Africa’s power 
and focused on prestige and the place 
of South Africa in the sub-regional, 
regional and global configuration of 
power. South Africa saw its role as trying 
Confronting the 
arrogance of France 
in Abidjan, and by 
implication, France’s 
wayfarer Nigeria, 
South Africa mobilised 
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wherewithal to 
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domineering  
attitude and role in  
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to shape a new world order7 by being 
the foremost articulator of the interests 
of the third world and, by implication, 
the preeminent African voice globally. 
More importantly, these ostensible 
global altruistic strivings are directed by 
the ultimate agenda to advance South 
Africa’s role in global affairs. The realist 
sub-current is to seek leadership in 
Africa. 
This institutional pole of South 
Africa’s policy is however also fixated 
on trade, trade, and more trade. The 
impression was then created that South 
African foreign policy is for sale.8 This 
element has a preference for traditional 
approaches to foreign policy. It 
ironically deploys South Africa’s 
commitment to liberal international 
multilateralism in the service of its 
realist objectives. This post-Apartheid 
South African neo-conservatism elicits, 
at the philosophical level, tensions 
with the radical instincts of progressive 
Africanist forces in South Africa’s policy 
process. South Africa’s membership of 
the BRICS is the classic expression of 
the deployment of a liberal institutional 
structure in the service of its realist 
aspirations. Meanwhile, the inclusion 
of the country in the G20 and the 
BRICS attest to the successes that 
Pretoria has achieved in international 
affairs. The response from Abuja was 
the creation of the Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey (MINT) group. It is 
a far less ambitious mechanism than 
the Concert of Medium Powers. 
The ‘Concert of Medium Powers’ 
or the ‘Lagos forum’ was Nigeria’s 
novel idea, developed by Prof Bolaji 
Akinyemi, then Foreign Affairs 
Minister, directed at the consolidation 
of Nigeria’s leadership role as a 
regional power in Africa and a force 
to be reckoned with in international 
affairs. Members of the forum were 
Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Zimbabwe, 
Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Senegal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, 
and Nigeria the host country. The aims 
and objectives of the forum included 
the consolidation of international 
peace and security through the process 
of confidence building among states 
especially the medium powers. In 
addition to this, the Lagos Forum, 
born in the context of the Cold War, 
was instigated by the need to fill the 
gap created by the stalemate in the 
conduct of international relations with 
occasion largely by the dominance 
of two major powers namely the 
United States and the Soviet Union.9 
That era also witnessed the birth of 
the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) by 
which Nigeria deployed its young and 
matured professionals to fill resource 
gaps in black nations all over the world. 
The ANC in its revolutionary struggle 
was a beneficiary of TAC.
Nigeria and South Africa are 
both candidates for the anticipated 
wimp permanent seat for Africa on 
the Security Council of the United 
Nations. It would be a significant irony 
that whichever of the putative local 
African wannabe hegemon is approved 
by elite forces in the global system 
for this position, it would mean the 
abandonment of the dominant realist 
principles on which the permanent seat 
in the Security Council was predicated. 
The second South African policy 
pole – founded on Afrocentric 
constructivist appreciations – is 
theoretically in a vicious clash with the 
conservative institutional policy circuit 
underpinned by South Africa’s realist 
aspirations. Yet, paradoxically, it is 
championed by the same articulators 
of the progressive front and is clearly 
driven by President Thabo Mbeki. This 
progressive dimension of South African 
policy derives from the historical import 
of the country. Relevant to this is an 
accrued national dividend in a massive 
global social capital implicitly rooted 
in the liberating symbolisms of the 
struggle that culminated in the pacific 
settlement of the problem of Apartheid 
South Africa. The final peaceful 
outcome of the struggle conferred on 
the country a unique moral stature 
in African affairs. It is this second 
impulse, now largely championed by 
Thabo Mbeki, in and out of office, 
which imbues the African renaissance 
framework with the attributes of a 
compelling mandate and an imperative 
call to action. The conceptual collisions 
but practical accommodation of 
the two contrasting policy poles, 
the institutional and the renascent 
dimensions, reflect a key catatonic 
character of the implementation of 
the two broad tendencies in post-
apartheid South Africa’s foreign and 
security policy. 
More recently, a more assertive, 
progressive, robust and confident 
intervention in South Africa’s 
engagement in the management of 
the Ivorian crisis affirmed a leadership 
mindset. In Cote d’Ivoire, the transfer 
of the Ivorian dossier to South Africa by 
the African Union seemingly came as 
a relief to ECOWAS, whose members 
appeared to have reached the end of 
their wits. With the overbearing attitude 
of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who 
was very much in tune with the agenda 
of France, President Laurent Gbagbo 
seemed to have lost confidence in the 
sub-regional consultations. President 
Arthur Mills had dissociated Ghana 
from Nigeria’s bellicose declaration 
to invade Cote d’Ivoire in favor of 
Ouattara. 
Frustration had reached a climax in 
the continent after the Abuja meeting, 
populated largely by Francophone 
states from Central Africa, facilitated 
the imposition of an arms embargo 
on the country and placed travel 
bans on certain individuals on both 
sides. It was known that at the same 
time France was funding, arming and 
kitting the Ivorian rebels. Also, many 
leaders from Francophone Central 
Africa had interjected themselves in 
to the process. Their perspectives 
were, by design, the same as France’s 
South Africa’s  
foreign and economic 
policies remain 
caught in a tension 
between its global 
vision of a global role 
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impulses on the one 
hand and its African 
nationalist renaissant 
imperatives that 
are also majorly 
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and reinforced France’s views. These 
leaders included Omar Bongo, then 
and late president of Gabon, who was 
overt in his sympathy for the Forces 
Nouvelles rebels and Sassou Nguesso 
of Congo (Brazzaville). 
The ensuing Pretoria process on 
the Ivorian conflict was unique in 
many ways. First, the African Union 
had consigned a crisis in West Africa 
to South Africa. It would seem that 
Thabo Mbeki did not think much of 
the lack of sophistication exhibited by 
the West Africans, in particular Nigeria, 
who seemed not to have understood 
or were indifferent to the historical 
import of the challenges confronting 
the Ivorian President. South Africa 
was conspicuously absent at the 
Abuja meeting that recommended 
the controversial imposition of an 
arms embargo at the behest of France. 
Confronting the arrogance of France 
in Abidjan, and by implication, 
France’s wayfarer Nigeria, South Africa 
mobilised the necessary wherewithal 
to credibly question the legitimacy of 
France’s domineering attitude and role 
in the crisis. And it demonstrated the 
political will to confront France on the 
Ivorian question in a manner that no 
West African state had done or been 
capable of doing. Also, in a move 
unprecedented in the management of 
the Ivorian peace process, following 
broad consultations with all the major 
protagonists in the crisis, the mediator, 
President Mbeki, was granted broad 
and unilateral powers by all the parties 
to make a determination of how to solve 
all the thorny substantive questions 
that had militated against the success 
of earlier agreements. This represented 
unusual trust, at least initially, in the 
neutrality of South Africa. The process 
was also a delicate test for South 
African diplomacy operating directly in 
West Africa. A key to the South African 
mediation was that it did not inherit 
the prejudices held against President 
Laurent Gbagbo.
In the Libyan crisis, the accretions 
of misgivings and divisions that were 
generated in Cote d’Ivoire found 
expression in profound divergences 
that reflected the clash of Afrocentric 
perspectives that ultimately was 
adopted by South Africa and the 
African Union and the rather narrow 
understandings and emotionally 
driven postures of President Goodluck 
Jonathan on the crisis that eventually 
consumed Libyan leader Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi. 
Having earlier voted for Security 
Council Resolution 1973, it soon 
became clear that the West, with 
France in the lead with the United 
States in tow, sought a regime change 
in that country. A first step was to delink 
Libya from black Africa as the West 
projected the crisis as the continuing 
spread of the Arab Spring in the Arab 
world. The African Union position that 
canvassed a negotiated settlement, 
adopted by President Jacob Zuma, 
in his capacity as the President of the 
African Union, clashed frontally with 
Nigeria’s early and what has proven 
to be a premature and unfortunate 
recognition of the Bengazi based rebel 
Transitional National Council. The 
TNC in Libya turned out to be a failed 
creation of the West. Meanwhile, 
the Secretary General of the African 
National Congress, Gwede Mantashe, 
observed that Nigeria’s recognition 
of TNC had jumped the gun. It may 
however be noted that the Bengazi 
rebellion began only shortly after the 
Libyan leader had recommended 
the breakup of Nigeria along ethno-
religious lines. The sentiment in Abuja 
was anchored on this unfortunate 
intervention of Gaddafi on a sensitive 
national subject. Again these divisions 
reverberated in the passions spewed 
out on the election of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma as President of the 
African Union Commission. Again, 
Nigeria’s anti-Zuma posture, seemingly 
protecting established conventions of 
the Union, coincided with France’s 
massive intervention to retain its crony 
Gabonese Jean Ping at the pinnacle of 
Africa’s continental institution. 
South Africa’s interventions in 
these critical events have reflected 
an incremental evolution in its 
sophistication in the implementation 
of the renaissant dimensions of its 
policy. At the same time, South Africa’s 
institutional proclivities, especially 
international multilateralism, have 
been aimed at achieving its aspirations 
as a regional power deserving of a place 
in global power play. The jury may 
still be out regarding whether South 
Africa’s interventions are motivated by 
its renaissant instincts or an extension 
of its realist inclinations to project 
power across the continent. 
Abuja is suspicions that the latter 
is the case, especially in relation to 
Pretoria’s robust engagements on the 
Ivorian crisis and its prescient posture 
on the Libyan crisis. In Cote d’Ivoire, 
Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck 
Jonathan administrations managed 
to squander Nigeria’s hitherto 
impeccable Africanist credentials in 
their almost embarrassing utter lack 
of strategic vision as they championed 
the interests of France in West Africa. 
As noted, Nigeria’s policy in Abidjan 
and South Africa’s leadership of the 
Afrocentric policy orbit in that crisis 
divided the continent on issues around 
Africa’s common position in Libya, and 
on the re-election of Gabonese Jean 
Ping – a candidate of France, and the 
triumph of Dlamini Zuma – perceived 
as a candidate of the progressive 
Africanist group of states. This strong 
charge of realist inclinations has seen a 
perceived weakening in the salience of 
the centrality of radical attributes of the 
African renaissance in South Africa’s 
African foreign and security policy. 
Nigeria has also more than illustrated 
its realist proclivities that have informed 
its sensibilities in relations with South 
Africa. The direction of Nigeria/
South Africa relations can be better 
understood in terms of an evolved but 
nuanced struggle for preponderant 
influence on the continent by these 
two major pivots of the emerged 
post-Cold War constellation of forces 
in Africa. 
South Africa’s affirmative vote on 
Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 
March 2011 on Libya, although later 
repudiated in a policy change, was in 
opposition to the abstention of Brazil, 
If these two  
countries combine and 
are able to pull their 
weight together in the 
continental security 
realm, it will have 
significant impact.
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Russia, India and China, its partners 
in BRICS. The resolution called for "an 
immediate ceasefire" and authorised 
the international community to establish 
a no-fly zone and to use all means 
necessary short of foreign occupation to 
protect civilians. The resolution formed 
the legal basis for western military 
intervention in the Libyan Civil War. The 
South African vote for SCR 1973, given 
South Africa’s frontline engagement in 
the Ivorian crisis when the underlying 
principle of Responsibility to Protect 
had been exploited to validate partisan 
international intervention on behalf of 
the Ivorian rebels, needs further to be 
clarified. 
South Africa’s foreign and economic 
policies remain caught in a tension 
between its global vision of a global 
role and institutionalist impulses 
on the one hand and its African 
nationalist renaissant imperatives that 
are also majorly articulated through 
informal channels.  In view of all the 
aforementioned, relations between 
South Africa and Nigeria have 
oscillated between the realist games 
nations play and feeble attempts at 
constructing new understandings to 
project common approaches to African 
affairs. The progressive constructivist 
impulse has clearly lagged behind 
the realist advances on the two sides 
to gain pre-eminence on African 
affairs. This game has been stoked by 
hegemonic forces, the United States 
of America and especially France with 
huge strategic stakes in the transformed 
strategic landscape in Africa. 
Put together, the foreign policies and 
global interactions of South Africa and 
Nigeria do not reflect their having fully 
digested the implications of the nasty, 
short and brutish trajectory of black 
humanity in the evolution of human 
society and the brutal hierarchical 
order in which Africa is trapped. 
Accordingly, neither does overall foreign 
policy articulation nor the bilateral 
relations flowing from the strategic 
template demonstrate an unwavering 
commitment to the fundamentals of 
their historic obligations. 
It is in this context that the pursuit of 
grand ephemerals has dominated the 
discourse on relations between Nigeria 
and South Africa in both countries. 
For example, when South African 
immigration officials deported Nigerian 
nationals who landed in South Africa 
without yellow fever certificates 
in 2010, Nigerian authorities 
subsequently retaliated by doing the 
same to South Africans who landed in 
Lagos.10 In 2015, when attacks were 
launched against foreigners, mainly 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, 
largely due to internal frustration by a 
mass of unemployed South Africans, 
Abuja was one of the earliest to recall 
its Ambassador. 
The Nigeria grouse machine against 
South Africa that has emerged in the 
academia and media spew invectives 
for a litany of perceived humiliating 
treatments of Nigerians. This includes 
South Africa’s perceived incessant 
incursion into what some consider 
Nigeria’s sphere of influence on the 
continent. At various times over the last 
five years, South African Immigration 
and Police authorities are alleged 
to have actively participated in the 
humiliation of Nigerians. In December, 
2013, between the 3rd and 4th to 
be precise, the South African Police 
Service stormed the Nigerian consulate 
and attempted to force their way 
in. This action was in breach of all 
known diplomatic and international 
conventions. Little was heard about the 
matter until the faceoff over attacks on 
foreigners. 
In September, 2014, the 
relationship between the two countries 
reached its lowest point with the arrest 
of two Nigerians and an Israeli national 
in South Africa after they attempted 
to smuggle US$15 million apparently 
meant for buying arms for the Nigerian 
intelligence service.11 The planned 
helicopter purchases and arms were to 
prosecute the war against Boko Haram. 
The suspected smugglers had landed 
at Lanseria International Airport, 
Johannesburg, on September 5, 2014 
in a private jet from Abuja with the 
money stashed in three suitcases. By 
July, 2015, the Nigerian government 
confirmed the return of the U$15 
million seized by the South African 
government. All of these, sensitive 
Nigerian nationalists argue, were parts 
of an orchestrated plot by South Africa 
to whittle down Nigeria’s influence in 
order to advance its own.12 
There exists a similar aisle of 
South African rather informed and 
ideologically inclined commentators 
determined to advance South 
Africa’s argument for a more robust 
engagement with Nigeria. They note 
relations between the two countries 
since apartheid have been dominated 
by clashes and tensions over a range of 
issues. They advance that these derive 
from the bitter fallout of the Mandela 
presidency, following the order by 
autocratic former Nigerian leader Gen 
Sani Abacha to hang Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight other human rights activists; 
to problems stemming from the 
countries’ competing aspirations for 
continental leadership, including 
Nigeria’s opposition to Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma’s bid for appointment as 
chairwoman of the African Union (AU) 
Commission and tit-for-tat spats over 
immigration policies. It is highlighted 
that the relationship was recently 
tested to the limit by the manner 
in which the Nigerian authorities 
responded to the deaths of 84 South 
Africans following the collapse of a 
church building in Lagos. Further, 
Abuja had recalled its ambassador 
to South Africa in protest against the 
2015 perceived xenophobic attacks 
against African immigrants. Asserting 
that judging by the mutual distrust, 
recriminations and, increasingly, the 
resentment that have characterised 
the relationship, it seems not even 
the binational commission – set up in 
1999 to bolster political, economic 
and diplomatic co-operation between 
the two countries – has improved the 
quality and effectiveness of bilateral 
engagement. The conclusion is drawn 
that the relationship between the two 
countries is a dysfunctional one.13
Flying in the face of this bleak 
evaluation, the Jacob Zuma and 
Muhammadu Buhari administrations 
would seem to have taken a leap that 
could radically realign the foreign policy 
orientations through a constructivist 
recalibration of the foundations of 
interaction between the two countries. 
The President’s visit is apart from 
other visits at the ministerial levels 
in respect of ruffled consular affairs 
for the umpteenth time. The latest of 
such ministerial  interventions being a 
South African delegation to evaluate 
the handling of the bodies of the 84 
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South African victims of the Friday, 12 
September, 2014 collapse of the hostel 
of the Synagogue belonging to Nigerian 
TV evangelist TB Joshua. Managing the 
grand pursuit of petty ephemerals, 
especially in the economic domain, 
has seen President Zuma visit Abuja 
twice. The latest was mainly instigated 
by a fine of $5 billion dollars imposed 
by the Nigerian Communication 
Commission on MTN, a South African 
company-operating in Nigeria. South 
Africa’s economic relations with 
Nigeria have been under a difficult 
political  cloud of mutual suspicions of 
hegemonic intentions. As crucial as the 
economic cooperation between the 
two countries is to the consolidation 
of relations, it has been mired in the 
pettiness of the ephemerals. 
This would seem to be consistent 
with the conclusions of Chris Alden 
and Mills Soko, who propose that 
South Africa's growing economic 
presence across the African continent 
has sparked a debate in public and 
scholarly circles as to its intentions. 
They note that while some interpreted 
the expansion of South African 
business as part of a larger hegemonic 
project, more structured analysis of 
economic ties with Africa reveals a 
more complex picture. Institutionalised 
forms of regional cooperation, such as 
the South African Customs Union and 
the Southern African Development 
Community must be contrasted 
with the activities of South African 
multinationals on the wider African 
stage to understand the possibilities 
and limitations of hegemonic practice 
open to South Africa. Finally, they 
argue that beyond its own region, a 
key determinant will be its relations 
with the other leading African power, 
Nigeria, as well as its ability to compete 
with other external actors.14 Despite 
these challenges, significant progress 
has been made in concretising 
commitments made in December, 
2008 to fast track trade and economic 
relations between both countries at 
the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National 
Commission (BNC).
Against this background, President 
Jacob Zuma’s visit in March 2016 to 
Abuja was important to protect the 
interests of the anxious 120 South 
African enterprises in Nigeria. Yet the 
most significant outcome of the visit 
was the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Nigerian 
military and the South African 
Defense Force on the deployment 
of South African military trainers to 
support Nigeria’s fight against Islamic 
fundamentalism and terrorism in its 
North East. Though a modest step, the 
potential implications are vast and far-
reaching. 
Against the background of the many 
petty misunderstandings, Osuolale 
Alalade15 perceives a potential tectonic 
shift in the foundations of Nigeria/ 
South Africa relations. He submits 
that the pettiness of the immediate 
past was fuelled by a lack of critical 
appreciation of the pivotal roles of 
the two countries for Africa’s ultimate 
emancipation. Given the consciously 
contrived perceptions and the reality 
of competitive relations instead of the 
natural allies that they are, it is asserted 
that the signing of the MoU indeed 
reflects a giant step not only for the two 
countries but for Africa. 
The MoU reflects a complete 
reorientation of the problematic 
understandings that only five years 
ago had almost brought the two 
countries into open confrontation 
in Cote d’Ivoire. It has thus set in 
motion the very first difficult steps to 
recalibrate the internal logic, protocols 
and workings of the African continent. 
If its implementation survives the 
shenanigans of the international system 
that the bold initiative is expected 
to invite, it has in the long term the 
potential to transform in a holistic 
manner Africa’s existential realities and 
realign Africa’s place in the constantly 
evolving landscape of humanity. 
This much was on the mind of 
President Zuma on that trip when he 
averred that South Africa and Nigeria 
are employing a common prism in 
looking at the security of the continent. 
If these two countries combine and are 
able to pull their weight together in the 
continental security realm, it will have 
significant impact. The South African 
president emphasised the nexus of 
the economy and security, stressing 
that once the economies of the two 
countries are integrated, approaches 
to the security of the continent will 
certainly take a different dimension 
because they will be protecting their 
joint and common public good. It will 
not be like one country protecting only 
its own; it will be all of us putting our 
efforts to protect the continent.16
By that single act and these 
proclamations, South Africa and 
Nigeria repudiated the nebulous 
concept of sovereignty, the foundations 
of the deleterious realist inclinations, 
as becoming anachronistic given the 
problematic realities of this generation. 
Sovereignty would no longer stand in 
the way of progressive and constructive 
collaboration in the advancement of 
the common interest of the peoples 
of the two countries. What touches 
Nigeria touches South Africa and vice 
versa. By the same logic, we may 
deduce that what impacts any one 
African state, concerns all the other 
fifty five African states and political 
entities. The integration of common 
and inclusive African imperatives as 
the basis of inter-state relations has 
long been overdue. President Jacob 
Zuma and his homologue in Nigeria, 
President Muhammadu Buhari, may 
have set in motion the new phase of 
the ultimate long walk to the holistic 
emancipation of Africa. ■
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